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REFERENCES TO PARTIES 
The parties are defendants/appellants John Seamons dba Big O 
Tire and Treco Inc. ("defendants"), and plaintiff/appellee 
Natalie H. Corbett ("plaintiff"). 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT ON ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In her opposing brief plaintiff reorders and restates 
defendants' Issue No. 2, and disputes the standard of review 
defendants suggest for that issue. Plaintiff misapprehends the 
issues raised by defendants' appeal, but does frame the nature of 
the parties' dispute. 
Plaintiff would have this Court address the question whether 
there was any evidence whatsoever from which a jury could 
conclude plaintiff had lost some earning capacity, and if so 
uphold the jury's verdict in the amount of nearly $70,000.00 for 
such alleged loss under a deferential standard. See Plaintiff's 
Brief at pp. 1-2. 
But the issue raised by defendants and addressed by the 
authorities defendants cite is different: 
There is no doubt from the entire record that the 
plaintiff sustained severe, permanent, and disabling 
injuries, which affected his past and future earning 
capacity. The question is, however, whether the 
evidence submitted was sufficiently probative and free 
from prejudicial error to permit the jury to make a 
finding on this [lost earning capacity] element of 
damages. 
See Featherly v. Continental Insurance Co., 243 N.W.2d 806, 809 
(Wis. 1976) (overturning verdict on earning capacity purportedly 
lost by business owner based on principles discussed in 
Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 924, comment c). 
The sufficiency issue here is whether labor replacement 
costs to a separate business entity, which business itself 
derived income from sources other than plaintiff's labor, is 
sufficiently probative to constitute the legally sustainable 
basis for the jury's award of lost personal earnings capacity in 
the amount of $70,000.00, when there was no foundational evidence 
plaintiff had ever derived personal earnings from the business, 
no showing the loss of plaintiff's time actually caused either 
the business or plaintiff herself to lose any net income, and no 
showing that the value of plaintiff's continued or unaffected 
time in the business was decreased by her change in activity. 
Defendants submit this issue is primarily a question of law, 
and one of first impression in this state. For the reasons set 
forth herein defendants request this Court's finding that the 
labor replacement cost evidence is inadmissible under the 
circumstances, and that even if admissible, the evidence is not 
sufficiently probative to prove plaintiff lost earning capacity 
in the amount claimed, or in any particular amount. 
1The other issues not substantially restated in plaintiff's 
brief are related: whether the evidence was admissible at all and 
whether, even admitted, it was such that the trial court was 
justified in instructing the jury plaintiff's damages "are the 
value of her time in the business." 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTION, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH A LOST EARNING CAPACITY CLAIM IN THE AMOUNTS 
THE JURY ULTIMATELY AWARDED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE LINKING THE LABOR REPLACEMENT COST 
EVIDENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL INCOME OR INCOME 
CAPACITY. 
Plaintiff first argues her earning capacity claim was 
properly established and proved under Clawson v. Walgreen Drug 
Co,, 162 P.2d 759 (Utah 1945), because there was unquestionably 
evidence: (1) plaintiff could not perform certain jobs or tasks 
in the family business she had previously done; (2) although the 
business continued on, the business had to hire replacement labor 
to perform those tasks; (3) the replacement labor costs were 
reasonable and necessary, at least to the business; and (4) 
plaintiff's expert testified these labor replacement costs 
represented lost "earning capacity" to plaintiff. See 
Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 10, 13-19.2 
It is significant, however, that plaintiff also admits, as 
she must, the following: (1) whether characterized as a sole 
2In the conclusion portion of her brief, but nowhere else, 
plaintiff asserts that defendants failed to marshal the evidence. 
See Plaintiff's Brief at p. 30. The only evidence defendants 
have not described in their brief, however, is the missing 
foundational evidence linking plaintiff's labor replacement costs 
with any effect on plaintiff's personal income. Compare 
Defendants' Brief at pp. 5-19, with Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 13-
18. Defendants are not required to marshall evidence that isn't 
there. See Kraus v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1022 
(Utah App. 1993). 
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proprietorship, corporation, dba, or other business entity, 
plaintiff's "family business" derived income from a variety of 
sources other than plaintiff's personal services (unlike, for 
example, a physician, whose income is wholly dependent on 
personal services); (2) whatever manual tasks plaintiff could not 
continue to perform in the business, she could continue, and did 
continue, to manage and supervise the business; and (3) there was 
no evidence offered as to the effect of the labor replacement 
costs on the business's net income, or on plaintiff's personal 
income, nor was there any evidence of the value of plaintiff's 
time as a manager and supervisor of the business. 
Therefore this case is factually distinguishable from 
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug, and is analogous to the number of cases 
cited by defendants. As set forth above, the issue in this case 
is whether the business's labor replacement costs were 
sufficiently probative of plaintiff's personal income capacity to 
make an award based on those costs legally sustainable as a 
matter of law. A number of courts have considered this precise 
question, including Featherly v. Continental Ins. Co., 243 N.W.2d 
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806 (Wis. 1976)3 and Seymour v. House. 305 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Supp. 
1957). 
In Featherlv, the plaintiff operated a logging partnership 
with his wife, and was involved in an automobile accident. He 
did a number a things in the business besides logging and sawing, 
including sales, administration, etc. At trial of his negligence 
claim, plaintiff introduced evidence showing that net profits 
from the logging business dropped over a four year period after 
his accident, and the jury awarded $100,000 for lost earning 
capacity. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the Restatement 
provision § 924 plaintiff relies on here, and held both that the 
net profit evidence was improperly admitted, and that even 
admitted it did not support a claim of lost earning capacity: 
These principles of law [comment c to Restatement 
§ 924 and supporting cases] make it clear that the 
summary of the profit and losses of [plaintiff's] 
logging business were admissible only to the extent 
that a foundation was layed to show a clear, causal 
connection between the diminution of profits and the 
lost earning capacity. 
Although the record is replete with evidence that 
[plaintiff's] injury diminished the profits from the 
business, the record leaves to speculation the extent 
3The difference between Featherly and this case, of course, 
is that here plaintiff does not attempt to show a loss measured 
by a drop in the business1 net profits, but instead attempts to 
show a loss measured by a single increased business expense. As 
the court in Seymour noted, such evidence is essentially the same 
thing despite plaintiff's protestations that all she is 
attempting to prove is a loss to herself. Compare Seymour v. 
House, 305 S.W.2d at 6, with Plaintiff's Brief at p. 22. 
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to which these profits proportionally or directly 
affected the loss of [plaintiff's] earning capacity. 
[Plaintiff] failed to show the value of his own 
efforts as they contributed to the profits. Although 
there was evidence of the market value of [plaintiff's] 
work as a logger and as a sawer, there was no evidence 
of [plaintiff's] earning capacity as a businessman in 
the selection of lumber, its purchase and sale, or the 
administration of the business. The only evidence 
indicating a connection between [plaintiff's] capacity 
to perform work and the profits of the company came 
from [plaintiff's] own testimony. He testified that a 
"good percentage" of the business profits was related 
to what he could do for the business personally and 
that the business depended on him. 
As we view this record, therefore, [plaintiff] 
failed to prove what is required by Wisconsin law—the 
quality and value of his services as they effected the 
profits of the business. He failed to prove the value 
of his services. The figures we derive from the 
evidence adduced at trial merely indicate that his 
services were valuable to the company, but so were the 
services of others and so was the capital investment. 
The jury was left to speculate in respect to the 
value of plaintiff's earning capacity. This it cannot 
be permitted to do. 
See Featherly v. Continental Ins. Co., 243 N.W.2d 806, 811-12 
(Wis. 1976). See also Condron v. Harl. 374 P.2d 613, 618-19 
(Hawaii 1962) (where court overturned earning capacity verdict 
for plaintiff business owner who had actually shown some income, 
both gross and net, before the accident because: 
This is not a case in which it can be said that the 
impairment of earning capacity was such that loss of 
earnings therefrom was reasonably certain. Rather, it 
is a case in which the impairment of earning capacity 
was doubtful and proof of loss of prior earnings was 
required to make it reasonably certain. Inability to 
work as hard as formerly does not, without more, lend 
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itself to measurement under the head of impairment of 
earning capacity, inasmuch as the impairment of earning 
capacity is too conjectural. 
(citations omitted)). 
Conversely, in Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co,, 162 P.2d 759 
(Utah 1945), the case was such that impairment of personal 
earning capacity was reasonably certain. The plaintiff was 
completely prevented by the injury at issue from pursuing his 
business, and therefore from receiving any income therefrom: 
"Plaintiff also testified that he was able, before the injury, to 
work as a trapper and farmer and that after the injury, he could 
not do such work." See 162 P.2d at 765. 
The distinction between Clawson and this case, especially as 
it relates to the certainty of the evidence, is that here the 
business continued after plaintiff's injury and plaintiff is not 
prevented from working in it. She just could not provide certain 
manual labor in the business that she had been previously been 
providing. Whether that inability had any effect whatsoever on 
her actual or potential earnings, however, was a matter of 
speculation because there was no evidence tying the labor 
replacement cost evidence to adverse effect on either net 
business income or personal income: 
Under the present evidence the jury could only 
speculate on that question. And, on the same 
principle, there should have been substantial evidence 
of the supposed past loss of earnings to support a 
finding on the value of the supposed impairment of 
plaintiff's ability to work and earn in the future; any 
finding of such "impairment" and its pecuniary value 
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must be based upon evidence which would permit the jury 
to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the future loss; 
it may not rest merely upon speculation. 
See Seymour v. House, 305 S.W.2d at 6.4 
POINT II 
MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE LABOR REPLACEMENT COST 
EVIDENCE, IF IT WAS ADMISSIBLE AT ALL, WAS ONLY A 
FACTOR THE JURY COULD CONSIDER IN ARRIVING AT THE VALUE 
OF PLAINTIFF'S TIME, AND WAS NOT, AS THE COURT 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY, A MEASURE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
Plaintiff's position on the jury instruction issues in this 
case ignores a simple and fundamental distinction between the 
correct instructions given (and applicable authorities) and the 
disputed instruction: When evidence of increased business 
expenses due to a personal injury is sufficiently connected to 
personal income to be admissible at all in a personal injury 
action, the evidence may be considered by the jury as a factor in 
awarding damages for claimed lost earning capacity. See, e.g.. 
R. at pp. 303, 305 (MUJI instruction and defendants' Instruction 
No. 28 apparently not disputed by plaintiff) and Featherly v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 243 N.W.2d at 811-12. But disputed 
Plaintiff argues Seymour is distinguishable because there 
was no evidence as to the reasonableness of the rates paid the 
replacement labor and here plaintiff called an economic expert to 
repeat her assertions. See Plaintiff's Brief at p. 19. Whether 
the rates were reasonable, however, is not material and the 
expert testimony suffers from the same defect as plaintiff's own 
testimony, it is based solely on the labor replacement costs and 
does not consider the value of plaintiff's remaining time in the 
business or whether plaintiff ever had personal income from the 
business. See TR at pp. 169-70, 180-81; R. at pp. 807-08, 818-
19. 
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Instruction No. 29 tells the jury "[plaintiff's] damages are the 
value of [her] services in the business during the period." Id. 
at p. 306 (emphasis added). That distinction gives rise to the 
legal error of which defendants complain. 
For example, in support of Instruction No. 29, plaintiff 
quotes extensively from the comments to Section 924 of the 
Restatement (2nd) of Torts. See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 22-25. 
Plaintiff argues essentially that because Instruction 29 is 
derived from the comments, and under certain circumstances labor 
replacement costs can constitute a method of proving a loss of 
earning capacity, the instruction accurately states the law: 
Jury Instruction No. 29 was nothing more than a brief 
summary of these authorities taken verbatim from 
Comment c of Section 924 of the Restatement (2nd) of 
Torts. It is an accurate statement of the law with 
respect to proof of loss of impaired earning capacity. 
Accordingly, the trial judge was correct and did not 
commit prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. 29. 
Id. 
The only case (or particular factual scenario) plaintiff 
cites for that proposition is Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d 874 
(Maine 1975). See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 23. In Ginn, 
however, plaintiff was a woods operator in business for himself 
whose business and income were entirely dependent on his personal 
services. See 334 A.2d at 877. The accident at issue rendered 
the plaintiff an invalid, and completely terminated his ability 
both to perform the tasks he had previously performed, and to 
derive any income from his services. J&. Under the 
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circumstances, his damages could appropriately be measured by the 
cost of replacing his labor in the business, or the value of his 
time in the business. 
Here, of course, the accident did not render plaintiff an 
invalid, but only prevented plaintiff from performing some of the 
more manual tasks required by the business. The business 
continued on without plaintiff's manual labor and she continued 
to supervise and manage the business, activities which there is 
no dispute held value (albeit uncalculated) to the business. 
Whatever income the business provided (in this case none prior to 
trial) continued to come plaintiff's way, if reduced in some 
unquantified amount. Thus plaintiff's only case is inapposite. 
And these distinctions are illustrated by the Restatement 
provision plaintiff relies on. As stated above, the issue here 
essentially concerns whether the business's labor replacement 
costs were sufficiently connected to plaintiff's personal earning 
capacity to make a jury award based upon such costs sufficiently 
certain to be sustainable. The comments to section 924 expressly 
direct the reader to section 912 for guidance on that question: 
"(See § 912, comment d, on the requirements of certainty in 
making proof of this [damages sustained by an "injured person who 
owned or was operating a business deprived of his services by 
injury"])." See Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 924 comment c. 
Section 912, comment d, in turn, provides in pertinent part: 
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As a condition to recovery for loss of earnings or 
earning capacity, the person harmed must offer 
evidence, convincing to the trier of fact, that a 
significant amount of earnings have been lost, or that 
his earning capacity has been significantly harmed. To 
do this he must introduce evidence of the amount of 
earnings received prior to the time of the injury, or 
the amount that he was capable of obtaining, and at 
east some evidence having a tendency to show that he 
could have earned something during the period in which 
loss of earnings is claimed. (See Illustrations 6 and 
7 and § 924, comments c, d and e). 
Id. at § 912 comment d. And illustrations 6 and 7 are as 
provided in defendants1 opening brief: 
A negligently harms B, a physician, who as a 
result is unable to attend to this patients. No 
evidence is offered of his income except that he had 
been practicing medicine in a small town for 8 years. 
B is entitled only to nominal damages. 
The same facts as [above] except that evidence is 
introduced to show that B's average income for the two 
years preceding the injury was $20,000, and that during 
his incapacity, while he employed a substitute at an 
expense of $10,000 yearly, his receipts from the 
practice dropped to $7,500 yearly. 
Id. 
This case is like the first illustration. Plaintiff 
introduced evidence that because of her injury she could not do 
the same tasks in the family business as she did before, and had 
to hire substitutes to perform those tasks. As in the first 
illustration, that proof allows an inference plaintiff may have 
lost earning capacity in some unknown amount. It is this 
inference plaintiff would have the Court focus on, and go no 
further. 
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But, and also as in the first illustration, plaintiff 
offered no evidence of any personal income from the business, let 
alone in any particular amount of personal income. She did not 
show her time in the business was less valuable after the 
accident. Gross receipts from the business actually rose after 
the accident, and for all anyone knows, the business might more 
effectively produce income with plaintiff spending more time in 
management, or just less time out mowing lawns. 
Thus pursuant to the illustrations of the Restatements 
principles, plaintiff's evidence was sufficiently speculative she 
would be entitled only to nominal damages. The trial court's 
instruction, however, and for no reason plaintiff can articulate, 
expressly equated plaintiff's damages with the labor replacement 
costs the jury had been given: "[plaintiff's] damages are the 
value of [her] services in the business during the period." See 
R. at p. 306, Instruction No. 29. 
In this regard, plaintiff points out the jury awarded only 
some $70,000.00 of the $181,000.00 actually requested by 
plaintiff for lost earning capacity. Plaintiff thus argues the 
jury must not have been confused by the instructions read as a 
whole, and didn't follow the court's direction. See Plaintiff's 
Brief at pp. 25-27. 
But plaintiff's argument ignores the contradiction between 
the instructions she relies on and the one she supports, and the 
lack of evidence plaintiff personally lost any income or capacity 
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to produce income because the business was required to replace a 
portion of her labor, let alone $70,000.00. Although defendants 
certainly did argue that the labor replacement cost evidence was 
only some evidence of the value of plaintiff's time in accordance 
with the rest of the instructions as plaintiff points out, 
Instruction No. 29 improperly took that argument away from 
defendants. 
Instead of only a factor to be considered under Instruction 
No. 28 and the other instructions read together, Instruction No. 
29 told the jury the lost time evidence constituted plaintiff's 
damages as a matter of law. Under the circumstances, the jury 
instruction alone entitles defendants to a new trial. See Brady 
v. Gibb. 886 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah App. 1994) ("[T]rial court 
confused the jury by instructing it to decide the case based on 
common knowledge or experience while, at the same time, 
instructing the jury that it had to decide the case based on 
expert opinion," thus requiring reversal because of "a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury's verdict may have been different absent 
the error.") and Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1989) (instructions incorporating plaintiff's expert 
testimony on standard of care prejudiced defendant and required 
reversal). 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SHOW HOW THE STATUTE AT ISSUE OR 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE STATUTE SUPPORTS AN AWARD 
OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON ANY KIND OF LOST EARNINGS 
CAPACITY, WHETHER PAST OR FUTURE. 
In opposition to defendants1 argument Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-44 does not authorize prejudgment interest on an award of 
"lost earning capacity," whether past or future, plaintiff points 
out only that the statute does not expressly exclude prejudgment 
interest on past lost earning capacity, like it does on future 
lost earning capacity. See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 28-29. 
Plaintiff then leaps to the unsupported conclusion that the trial 
court's award thus "falls squarely within the express language of 
the statute." Id. 
Plaintiff's argument fails because where the language of the 
statute does not expressly cover the question, the Court must 
look to the legislative intent. See Gleave v. Denver & Rio 
Grande, 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988) (in construing this 
statute Utah courts "must give effect to the legislature's 
underlying intent."). The legislature did not intend to provide 
for an award of prejudgment interest on past lost earning 
capacity under the present circumstances. 
The legislative history as illustrated by the Gleave opinion 
indicates that prejudgment interest should only be awarded on: 
those expenses that [plaintiffs] have paid out of their 
pocket, for which they have used their own money and 
which they will not get until the settlement of their 
action. Getting interest on their out of pocket 
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expenses will provide a total recoupment of any 
expenses that they have had from the time of accident 
until they are paid in full by recover at court or by 
settlement. 
Id. 
As set forth at length above, there was no evidence 
presented to the jury that plaintiff herself incurred any out-
of-pocket expenses in the form of lost wages or actual lost 
earnings whatsoever. In fact it is undisputed plaintiff had no 
personal earnings from the business and did not expect any until 
sometime after the trial. The only evidence presented was that 
the plaintiff's business incurred labor replacement costs, which 
may or may not have had any effect whatsoever on plaintiff's 
actual income. 
Under the circumstances, the addition of prejudgment 
interest on any amount of lost earning capacity up until the time 
of trial was inappropriate as inconsistent with the statutory 
intent, whether or not specifically prohibited by the statute. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons stated above and in defendants' opening 
brief, defendants respectfully request this Court's Order 
remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to enter 
judgment in accordance with defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict on plaintiff's claim for lost earning 
capacity. In the alternative, defendants request the Court's 
order remanding the case for a new trial, and order that 
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prejudgment interest is not properly added to damages awarded for 
"lost earning capacity," whether past or future. 
DATED this 2- / aay of February, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
SH\RCK\06205.253\BIGORPLY.BRF 
-16-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed first class, 
postage prepaid, two (2) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS JOHN SEAMONS DBA BIG O TIRE AND TRECO, INC., this 
day of February, 1995, to the following: 
Reed W. Hadfield 
Stephen R. Hadfield 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Zions Bank Building 
98 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
-17-
